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ABSTRACT
Whilst some valid and justified arguments have been put forward in favour of ring fencing, that is, 
constructing a fire-wall between consumer and investment banks, and that such activities can be 
achieved without re structuring banks into separate legal entities, the Liikanen Report highlights 
why there is need for such re structuring. As well as considering the merits of ringfencing and the 
establishment of separate legal activities and entities, this paper aims to highlight why a suitable 
model aimed at mitigating risks of contagion can to a large extent, be justified on a cost-benefit 
analysis basis.
Furthermore, the paper ultimately concludes that even though a greater degree of separation of legal 
entities and activities persist with the model which is referred to as „total separation“, a certain 
degree of independence between bank activities would also be necessary under ring fencing if its 
purposes and objectives are to be fulfilled.
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A.  Introduction
In  the  Final  Report  of  „The High-Level  Expert  Group on  Reforming the  Structure  of  the  EU 
Banking Sector, chaired by Erkki Liikanen,1 the need for re structuring banks into separate legal 
activities is highlighted. In assessing such a need, two considerations were given due attention:2
− The important role of recovery and resolution plans – whereby the decision on possible 
separation of bank entities was to be conditionally based on the assessment of such plans;
− The mandatory separation of banks' proprietary trading and other risky activities.
The  mandatory  separation  of  banks'  proprietary  trading  and  other  risky  activities  could  be 
distinguished from the case which exists with Volcker's Rule in that an outright ban or prohibition 
on proprietary trading (all forms of risky investment practices) and certain relationships with hedge 
funds and private equity funds is not implied under such mandatory separation.
The „Volcker Rule“ which can be found under Section 6193 of Title VI of the Dodd Frank Act states 
that : 
‘‘(1) PROHIBITION: Unless otherwise provided in this section, a banking entity shall not— 
‘‘(A) engage in proprietary trading; or 
‘‘(B) acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge 
fund or a private equity fund. 
‘‘(2)  NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES SUPERVISED BY THE BOARD:  Any nonbank 
financial company supervised by the  Board that engages in proprietary trading or takes or retains 
any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsors a hedge fund or a private equity 
fund shall be subject, by rule, as provided in subsection (b)(2), to additional capital requirements for 
and additional quantitative limits with  regards to such proprietary trading and taking or retaining 
any equity...........“
Whilst the Volcker Rule is considered by some commentators as being parallel to a separation of 
banking activities and entities, it is more draconian in the sense that the model allows for less scope 
1 Hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Liikanen  Report  (Final  Report,  2nd  October  2012)  „The  Liikanen  Review was 
established in November 2011 by EU commissioner, Michel Barnier, to conduct a full scale analysis of Europe's 
lending sector and recommend banking reforms for the region.“ See G Varriale, „Liikanen Poll: Volcker/Vickers 
Hybrid Wrong For Europe's Banks, 18 September 2012
2 See page i of the Report
3  SEC. 619. PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING AND CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE 
FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS.
3and flexibility than  the „hybrid“  model  which is  being considered  under  the  Liikanen Review. 
Those arguments which increasingly favour a more flexible model and which is directed in favour 
of ring fencing, arise from the inherent difficulties in the definitions attributed to financial and non 
bank financial companies. Since such definitions present some ambiguities, is it really possible to 
effectively establish „completely“  separate  legal  entities  and activities? As the case has  always 
been,  ambiguities  with  legal  definitions  will  always  provide  a  leeway for  financial  institutions 
(whether non bank financial or financial institutions) to manipulate the rules. Furthermore, other 
complexities  arise  from  corporate  ownership  structures  of  banking  groups  across  various 
jurisdictions  –  particularly  where  such  groups  operate  across  various  jurisdictions  with  huge 
differences in legal definitions and operating activities.
The Vicker's Report also adds that prohibiting only those activities caught by the Volcker rule would 
not achieve all of the objectives of ring-fencing.4 
It is interesting to note that the Liikanen Report also highlights that „in the discussions  within the 
Group, some members expressed a  preference for a combination of measures: imposing a non-risk-
weighted capital buffer for trading activities and leaving the separation of activities conditional on 
supervisory approval  of  a  recovery and resolution  plan,  rather  than  a  mandatory separation  of 
banking activities.“5 
„In the spirit of transparency both basic alternatives and their motivation“ were presented in the 
report  -  however,  the option was made to recommend „mandatory separation of certain trading 
activities.“
As stated earlier, the mandatory separation of banks' proprietary trading and other risky activities, 
such as that opted for under the Liikanen Report, could be distinguished from the case which exists 
under Volcker's Rule and could be considered a hybrid in the sense that it does not impose such 
stringent  requirements  as  those  applicable  under  Volcker's  Rule  whilst  not  being  as  „watered 
down“6 as the ring fencing recommendations in the  Vickers Report.
Whilst a hybrid model for European banks may appear to have its merits, it will be demonstrated 
that risks are inherent in both models – whether these relate to complete separation of legal entities 
or whether these are based on ring fencing alone. The distinction between what could be considered 
to be risky bank trading activities and less risky ones and whether the goals to be achieved through 
such a distinction could effectively be realised through the re structuring of banks into separate 
legal entities, as well as cost considerations involved in undertaking such re structuring will be 
discussed in subsequent sections of this paper. 
B. Objectives of the Legal Separation of Financial Activities and Banking Entities and  
Arguments in Favour of Ring Fencing
In concluding that „it is necessary to require legal separation of certain particularly risky financial 
activities  from  deposit-taking  banks  within  a  banking  group“,  the  High  Level  Expert  Group 
4 See The Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), Final Report, Recommendations, September 2011 at page 45
5 See page ii of the Liikanen Report.
6 See Daily Telegraph, Paul Volcker: Ring-fencing Banks is Not Enough, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9561624/Paul-Volcker-ring-fencing-banks-is-
not-enough.html>
4highlighted the „central objectives“ of such a separation, which are as follows:7
– To  make  banking  groups  –  particularly  their  socially  most  vital  parts  safer  and  less 
connected to high risk trading activities;
– To limit the implicit or explicit stake of tax payer in the trading parts of banking groups.
Further objectives could be the Group's opinions that:8
– Separation of such activities (between high risk and less riskier ones) into separate legal 
entities is the „most direct way of tackling banks' complexity and interconnectedness and 
that;
– As such, separation would make banking groups simpler and more transparent; as well as
– Facilitate market discipline and supervision and, ultimately, recovery and resolution.
As re iterated earlier, those not in favour of a mandatory separation of banking activities, whose 
objectives are listed above, opted for a „preference for a combination of measures which consists of 
imposing a  non risk weighted capital  buffer for trading activities and leaving the separation of 
activities conditional on supervisory approval of a recovery and resolution plan.“
Whilst such objectives of a mandatory separation of banking activities are justified, proponents of 
ring  fencing,  namely  those  opting  for  ring  fencing  rather  than  a  complete  separation  of  retail 
banking from riskier investment banking divisions, have put forward several arguments in favour of 
ring fencing activities. 
The following sub section considers the purpose of ring fencing as well as arguments in favour of 
ring fencing.
According to Vickers Report9 the purpose of ring fencing is „to isolate those banking activities 
where continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a bank’s customers in order to 
ensure, first, that this provision is not threatened as a result of activities which are incidental to it 
and,  second,  that  such  provision  can  be  maintained  in  the  event  of  the  bank’s  failure  without 
government  solvency support.“  Furthermore,  it  was added in the Report10 that  in achieving the 
purposes of ring fencing, that retail banking activities should have economic independence,11 as 
well as the requirement of measures for independent governance which is aimed at enforcing „the 
arm's length relationship“.
7 See page i of the Liikanen Report. „The Group's recommendations regarding separation concern businesses which 
are considered to represent the riskiest parts of trading activities and where risk positions can change most rapidly“
8 See page ii of the Liikanen Report.
9 Page 35; For further information on the location of the ring fence see page 36 
10 See page 12
11 Economic independence, it is added „ requires firstly, that the UK retail subsidiary of a wider banking group should 
meet regulatory requirements for capital, liquidity, funding and large exposures on a stand alone basis, and secondly, 
that  the permitted extent of its relationships with other parts of the group should be no greater than regulators 
generally allow with third parties and should be conducted on an arm's length basis.“
5Arguments in favour of ring fencing are as follows:12
– Ring fencing should generate „significantly lower economic costs“ than full separation;
– Ring fencing would secure principal benefits  such as guarding against  certain contagion 
risks;
– The fact  that  challenges encountered by ring fencing are manageable and not materially 
greater than those of full separation;
– Legal impediments which exist with full separation;
– It  is  not  certain  whether  total  separation  would  necessarily  facilitate  greater  financial 
stability13
– That total separation is harder to enforce under European Union Law inasmuch as universal 
banks in other member states remain entitled to own UK retail  banking operations.
– The „workability“ and „practicability“ of ring fencing and the fact that ring fenced banks 
would be easier to monitor, supervise and manage than universal banks „other things being 
equal.“
– The argument that it can be „robustly“ implemented within the current EU framework and 
the difficulty in securing changes to relevant EU Law;
– Legal obstacles which persist with „full separation“ particularly since European Law places 
constraints on the degree to which ownership of companies can be controlled;
– That ring fenced banks should be able to engage in effective risk management.“
Ring fencing, hence,  obviously has immense benefits attached to its implementation – however 
prominent proponents of complete legal separation, include Mr Volcker who adds that „even though 
the Vickers Report (John Vickers) and himself have the same concerns in mind, the logic would be 
to separate the two parts of banking, not to keep them within the same institution.“14 Furthermore, 
he adds that it was unclear how the two parts of banking could be entirely independent when under 
ring fencing they would be subordinated to the holding company. Whilst the Financial Services 
Authority  Prudential  chief,  Bailey,  has  publicly  supported  the  need  for  a  separation  of  trading 
activities into separate legal entities,15 the Bank of England's Mervyn King has also expressed his 
disappointment over the decision to opt for ring fencing rather than total separation.16
Vickers Report also acknowledges those advantages inherent in the separation of legal entities:17
– 1)  Argument  that  common ownership increases  contagion from the rest  of  the financial 
12 The Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), Final Report, Recommendations, September 2011 at pages 12, 26, 
59 and 65.
13 „It would remove a channel of contagion risk from investment banking to retail banking (and vice versa) but 
preclude support for troubled retail banks from elsewhere in banking groups.“
14 See Daily Telegraph, Paul Volcker: Ring-fencing Banks is Not Enough, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9561624/Paul-Volcker-ring-fencing-banks-is-
not-enough.html>
15 See G Varriale, „Liikanen Poll: Volcker/Vickers Hybrid Wrong For Europe's Banks, 18 September 2012
16 See Daily Telegraph, Paul Volcker: Ring-fencing Banks is Not Enough, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9561624/Paul-Volcker-ring-fencing-banks-is-
not-enough.html>
17 The Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), Final Report, Recommendations, September 2011 at page 63
6system to retail banks through increased reputational links.
– 2) Argument that  it is not possible to implement effective rules governing economic links 
between banks unless they are in separate corporate groups.“ 
The Report however adds that „the risk that the rest of the group could bring down a ring-fenced 
bank could be managed by insisting that the ring-fenced bank is not dependent for its solvency, 
liquidity or continued operations on the rest of the group.“18 In bolstering arguments which favour 
ring fencing, the Report also adds that  even though arguments persist in favour of complete 
separation, namely, that: 
– i) by removing difficult to resolve wholesale/investment banking activities from ring-fenced 
banks, the problem is transferred elsewhere but not solved,
– and  ii); that in a world of ring-fencing, governments would continue to bail out non-ring-
fenced banks,19
that reforms introduced in  the aftermath of Crises such as that  of Lehman Brothers including 
greater use of central counterparties and proposals included in Chapter 4 of the Report (Vickers 
Report) ensure that creditors are appropriately exposed to losses. 
Having considered both models, it  (ultimately) has to be said that both involve some degree of 
separation of legal entities or banking activities. The difference between both lies in the extent of 
such a separation. Whilst achieving the purposes of ring fencing would require some degree of 
economic independence for retail banking activities, a greater degree of independence, is certainly 
characteristic of a complete separation of banking activities or legal entities within the group.
18  „ Full separation has risks as well as benefits. Reputational links mean that it is likely that a ring-fenced bank would 
if possible be saved from failure by the rest of its corporate group if it got into difficulty. When domestic retail 
banking is suffering losses but the rest of the banking system is doing well, more retail banks would fail under full 
separation than under ring-fencing.“ See ibid
19 See ibid page 46
7C Conclusion
Given  the  risks  and  benefits  inherent  under  both  models  of  ring  fencing  and  complete  legal 
separation, it appears that the more favourable model will largely be decided on a cost analysis 
basis. It is most certain and apparent that no model could ever completely eliminate risks and that a 
complete and total separation of legal activities or entities also, would practically be impossible or 
not feasible.
„Significant differences in the ownership structure and corporate governance arrangements between 
different banks“ as well as „significant diversity in bank business models across the EU and across 
EU Member States, numerous labels which exist to classify banks and their business models“,20 
would also present immense challenges for the model being proposed under the Liikanen Report.
Potential  legal  impediments  and  leeway  for  banks  in  manipulating  rules  owing  to  existing 
definitions of financial institutions also persist – particularly with the option involving a „complete“ 
separation of legal entities and activities.21 While cost arguments have been advanced in favour of 
ring fencing, the same arguments are considered to be instrumental in compelling some universal 
banks to consider the option of complete separation.
20  „These labels typically focus only on one  or two of the numerous  dimensions  along which different bank business 
models may differ.  The labels may  conceal that, for example,  some  of  today's  universal  banks  operate  quite 
differently  from how  they  operated  30  years ago. In  general, bank business models can be characterised in terms 
of several key dimensions or attributes: (i) size; (ii) activities, as evident from a bank's customer base, asset structure 
and  income model;  (iii)  capital  and funding structure;  (iv)  ownership and  governance;  (v)  corporate  and legal 
structure; and (vi) geographic scope, including  how  cross-border operations  are legally and operationally 
structured. „ See pages 32 and 50 of the Liikanen Report
21  In respect of definitions see pg 58 of Vicker's Report and also 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/een00074.htm. 
Financial institutions are considered to be “all corporations and quasi-corporations which are principally engaged in 
financial intermediation and/or in auxiliary financial activities”. Financial intermediation is in turn defined as “the 
activity in which an institutional unit acquires financial assets and liabilities on its own account by engaging in 
financial transactions in the market”.
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